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Present Constitution: the status quo 
 
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland consists 
of four countries: England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.1  
                                                 
*Foreign  & International Law Librarian, Squire Law Library, University of 
Cambridge, UK.  
**Bradley Miller, Reference Librarian, Squire Law Library, University of Cambridge, 
UK. (Present address: 196 Central Drive, Ancaster, Ontario, Canada L9G 2A4). 
1 As defined by the 1969 Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969-1973 Report, 
Cmnd 5460, October 1973. 
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Legislative competence for the UK resides in the Westminster Parliament, but 
there are three legal systems (England and Wales, Northern Ireland, and 
Scotland) with separate courts and legal professions.  These legal systems 
have a unified final court of appeal in the House of Lords.2  The Isle of Man, 
and the two Channel Islands (Guernsey and Jersey) are not part of the UK, but 
possessions of the crown.  Although their citizens are subject to the British 
Nationality Act 1981, the islands have their own legal systems.3  They are 
represented by the UK government for the purposes of international relations, 
but are not formal members of the European Union.4 
 
The United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral 
parliament composed of the Houses of Commons and Lords.  Formally, 
executive power is vested in the Crown in the person of the Sovereign, but in 
reality, central government is carried out in the name of the Crown by 
ministers of state.5  The powers of the Sovereign and the Crown derive either 
from Acts of Parliament or are prerogative (i.e., recognised in common law).  
There is no formal separation of the powers of the legislature and executive 
and while legislative authority is vested in the Sovereign in Parliament, 
ministers responsible for implementing new acts are also involved in the 
process of legislation.  Similarly, in the House of Lords, the Lords who sit as 
judges in the Appellate Committee can also take part in the legislative 
business of the upper house.6  
 
It is often suggested informally that the United Kingdom does not 
have a written constitution.  This is not strictly true; rather, what it does not 
have is a single document setting out the legal framework and functions of the 
organs of government and the rules by which it should operate.  Such 
documents are a declaration of a country’s supreme law and have overriding 
legal force to empower a constitutional court to declare acts of the legislature 
illegal if they conflict with the rights embodied in such a formal constitution.  
In this, the UK currently differs from many other countries, such as the United 
States, Ireland, Germany, France and South Africa.  
 
                                                 
2 Except for Scottish criminal cases. 
3 Final court of appeal for these is the Privy Council. 
4 They are exempt from much of the Treaty of Rome, although provisions relating to 
the free movement of industrial and agricultural goods apply, as does adherence to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
5 A.W. Bradley & K.D. Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (2003): 233. 
6 Ibid., 79, 88. 
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The constitution of the United Kingdom, in contrast, is a “whole 
system of government...(with a)...collection of rules which establish and 
regulate or govern the government.”7  The system is based on a combination 
of “Acts of Parliament and judicial decisions...political practice…and detailed 
procedures established by various organs of government for carrying out their 
own tasks.”8  Examples of the latter are “the law and custom of Parliament” 
and the “rules issued by the Prime Minister to regulate the conduct of 
ministers.”9  In effect, Parliament has the right to modify the constitution of 
the United Kingdom on the basis of simple majorities in the two Houses of 
Parliament.10 
 
The constitutional status quo in the UK has resulted in a very flexible 
system in which governance depends on political and democratic principles 
rather than a rigid mechanism relying on legal rules and safeguards.  This can 
be construed as both a strength and a weakness, but for reform it has several 
important consequences.  For example, there are no special procedures for 
proceeding with new constitutional arrangements, and all such acts must pass 
through the Westminster Parliament in the normal legislative manner.  In 
addition, no truly federal arrangement can be established within the United 
Kingdom while the Westminster Parliament remains supreme: it currently 
retains the right to revoke power recently devolved to Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales. 
 
There are numerous items of legislation from mediaeval to modern 
times that have shaped the constitution, and a few can be singled out as 
particularly significant.11  
· Magna Carta.   Granted by John in 1215, with the current 
version approved by the English Parliament granted by 
Edward I (1297).  It established that punishment should be by 
                                                 
7 K. C. Wheare, Modern Constitutions (1966): 1. 
8 Bradley & Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 4. 
9 Bradley & Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 5. For examples: Civil 
Service Code, Ministerial Code - A Code of Conduct and Guidance on Procedures for 
Ministers, Departmental Evidence and Response to Select Committees, Government 
Accounting. 
10 See: C. Turpin, British Government and the Constitution: Text, Cases and 
Materials, (2002): 10; D. Oliver, Constitutional Reform in the UK, (2003): 5. 
11 See examples listed under “Constitutional Law” in Halsbury’s Statutes of England 
and Wales (2001). 
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judgment of one’s peers or the law of the land, and that 
justice cannot be denied to an individual. 12 
· Petition of Rights .  Enacted by the English Parliament in 
1628.  It outlawed without Parliament’s consent taxation, 
arbitrary imprisonment, use of martial law in peacetime and 
billeting soldiers on private persons.13 
· Habeas Corpus Act 1679.  Habeas corpus is a remedy 
against unlawful detention, and this Act placed heavy 
penalties on the evasion of the writ by transfer of persons 
outside the jurisdiction of English courts. 
· Bill of Rights and Claim of Rights .  Enacted by the English 
and Scottish parliaments in 1689 at the time of the restoration 
of the monarchy.  Laid the foundations for the modern 
constitution in a series of articles. Many of its provisions are 
still in force. 
· Act of Settlement 1700.  Dealt with succession to the throne 
and complemented the provisions in the Bill of Rights.  It 
established, inter alia , that judges should not hold office at 
the pleasure of the Crown. 
· Treaty of Union 1707.  Act formalising the union of England 
and Wales with Scotland. 
· Union with Ireland Act 1800.  Act formalis ing the union of 
England and Wales and Scotland with Ireland. 
· Reform Act 1832.  Enacted large-scale changes to the 
franchise, resulting in a more equitable distribution of seats, 
and a shift of political power away from the landowning 
classes.  This Act disposed of the infamous “Rotten 
Boroughs.”  
· Parliament Act 1911 and 1949.  Acts including fixing the 
duration of Parliament, and defining the relations between the 
houses of Lords and Commons. 
· Crown Proceedings Act 1947.  Government departments 
and ministers became liable to be sued for wrongful acts, 
establishing a doctrine of government according to law.  The 
Sovereign has personal immunity.  
· European Communities Act 1972.  Gave effect within the 
UK to those provisions within EC law which, according to 
various treaties, have direct effect within member states. 
                                                 
12 J. C. Holt,  Magna Carta, (1992). 
13 Bradley & Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 14. 
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According to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), this means 
that Community law prevails over any inconsistent provisions 
of the national law of member states.14  In effect, if 
Parliament legislates in  breach of Community law, the courts 
within the UK must not apply the conflicting domestic law. 
· British Nationality Act 1981.  Defined nine categories of 
citizenship and five ways of acquiring British citizenship.  
· Public Order Act 1986.  Introduced statutory powers 
allowing the police to severely limit public processions and 
assemblies. 
Also, since 1973, when the then Labour government held a referendum on 
confirming membership of the European Economic Community, a practice 
has developed of holding referenda on important constitutional matters. 
 
Judicial decisions also provide rules of law which can have 
constitutional significance; the doctrine of precedent dictates that such 
decisions are binding on lower courts.  This judge-made law can emanate 
from two sources: common law and interpretation of statutes.  Common law 
decisions have been authoritative in a variety of areas, such as prerogatives of 
the Crown, remedies against illegal acts of officials and public authorities, the 
writ of habeas corpus, and the obligation to give a hearing.  Such decisions 
can be overturned by Parliament, however, and even House of Lords’ 
decisions are vulnerable to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on matters of 
European Union (EU) law, and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
in relation to the European Convention on Human Rights.  
 
While the courts cannot rule on the legality of Acts of Parliament, 
they can interpret statutes where the meaning is disputed, and they are to 
divine objectively the intention of Parliament.  It is presumed that the 
legislature will not intentionally remove common law rights by implication, 
so that fundamental rights cannot be overridden except by express wording.15  
However, since joining the European Union, British courts must follow the 
ECJ’s lead in interpreting legislation flowing from EC directives. 
Consequently, if any statute enacted by Parliament after January 1, 1973 is in 
question, the courts are obliged to interpret it so as to reconcile it with any 
relevant EU law in force in the UK. 
 
                                                 
14 Bradley & Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 68. 
15 Ibid., 18. 
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As for Parliament itself, in contrast to states with written 
constitutions, its length of term is not entrenched, and under the rules of 
parliamentary sovereignty it can decide its own duration, sometimes under 
controversial circumstances.16  The current life of a parliament was set at a 
maximum of five years in the Parliament Act 1911, although during the last 
two world wars this was temporarily extended. Currently there are no 
published plans to alter the status quo or to circumscribe the government’s 
ability to decide (through the sovereign’s prerogative) to foreshorten a term 
and call a general election, but from time to time private members’ bills have 
been introduced (unsuccessfully) to legislate on the issue.17 
 
In this summary we outline steps that have been implemented to 
reform the constitutional system of the UK since New Labour came to power 
in 1997.  It must be remembered, however, that this has been a subject of 
debate for over a century and that several important alterations have already 
been undertaken.  These changes consist of mainly matters relating to the 
makeup and powers of the House of Lords.  
 
A fundamental change was introduced in the Parliament Acts of 1911 
and 1949. In these Acts, the formal legislative powers of the House of Lords 
were curtailed, effectively moving the center of gravity of power in 
Parliament to the House of Commons and allowing the governing party to 
impose its will on Parliament.  As a result, the role of the upper chamber was 
limited simply to an ability to revise legislation through the imposition of 
amendments and to delay the implementation of contentious legislation. 18 
  
 Important changes had also been affected to the membership of the 
House of Lords.  Historically, this had been restricted to hereditary peers and 
26 bishops and archbishops of the Church of England. 19 It was modified by 
the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876, which allowed for the appointment of 
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary to sit in the upper House, the so-called Law 
                                                 
16 For example, during the 1715 Scottish uprising.  It has fluctuated from three years - 
Meeting of Parliament Act 1694 (Triennial Act) to seven years - Septennial Act 1715: 
see Bradley & Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 55 & 180 for further 
details. 
17 For example, see Turpin, British Government and the Constitution , 206. 
18 Bradley & Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 196. 
19 Ibid., 174.  In the Ecclesiastical Commissioners Act 1847, appointments to new 
diocesan bishoprics were disallowed from sitting in the House of Lords. 
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Lords, whose titles are not hereditary.20  The Life Peerages Act 1958, allowed 
for the appointment of peers to sit in the Lords for the duration of their lives, 
although these titles are not hereditary.21  The latter Act weakened the 
hereditary principle, and at a stroke, strengthened the ability of the 
government of the day to increase its power in the upper chamber.  A further 
change was made in the Peerage Act 1963 to allow a hereditary peer to 
disclaim the title for life so that the holder could sit in the House of 
Commons.22  
 
Background to post-1997 proposals for constitutional change  
 
Although the Labour party has long had a predisposition towards 
constitutional reform – both the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 and Parliament 
Act 1949 were products of this policy – the current major constitutional 
changes and proposals have their seeds in   party policy documents.23  
Immediately upon assuming office in 1997, the New Labour government 
established various review committees and initiated proposals covering a wide 
range of constitutional matters, in addition to reconsidering policies 
formulated for the election campaign. 24  These included:  
· electoral reform and, in particular, the voting system for Westminster 
elections (Jenkins Commission 1998);  
· funding of political parties (Neill Committee 1998);  
· electoral law and administration (Howarth Committee 1998);  
· modernization of the House of Commons (Select Committee 1997-
98);  
· reform of the House of Lords (Special Report, 2002);  
· introduction of a Bill of Rights (Consultation Paper 1996);  
                                                 
20 Originally (1876) there were two Lords of Appeal in Ordinary.  By 1994 this 
number had risen to 12. Under the Administration of Justice Act 1968 the Sovereign 
may increase the number further by a Statutory Instrument approved by both houses 
of Parliament. The Lords of Appeal in Ordinary join Lords of Appeal who are already 
in the upper house by virtue of their hereditary peerages. 
21 Bradley & Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 173. 
22 Ibid., 176.  The Act followed the unsuccessful action by Viscount Stansgate in Re 
Parliamentary Election for Bristol South East [1964] 2 QB 257. This legislation has 
been superseded by the House of Lords Act 1999. 
23 Labour Party Final Report,1989; Labour Party Policy Commission (1993). 
24 See the following for a discussion by academic writers on the implications of early 
New Labour policies: R. Blackburn & R. Plant, Constitutional Reform: The Labour 
Government’s Constitutional Reform Agenda, (1999) 
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· introduction of a Freedom of Information Act (Joint Committee, 
Labour-Liberal Democrat parties,1997);  
· consideration of English regional government (Labour Party, 1996);  
· creation of a Ministry of Justice (Labour Party, 1995), and  
· devolution to Scotland and Wales.25  
 
 Plans were also announced for a revitalization of the government’s 
policy-making capacity and capabilities.26   Many of these “bold and 
ambitious” initiatives resulted in a surge of important constitutional 
legislation early in Labour’s first parliamentary session included:  
· Scotland Act 1998,  
· Government of Wales Act 1998,  
· Northern Ireland Act 1998, 
· Human Rights Act 1998,  
· Regional Development Agencies Act 1998,  
· European Parliamentary Election Act 1999,  
· Bank of England Act 1998,  
· Registration of Political Parties Act 1998,  
· Greater London Authority Referendum Act 1998, and  
· White Papers dealing with freedom of information (Cm 3818, 1997) 
and reform of local government (Cm 4310, 1999).27  
 
 All this activity was overseen by the Constitutional Reform Policy 
Committee of the Cabinet under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, and 
more recently by the Lord Chancellor.  It gave the impression that a 
systematic policy of reform was underway, that has been described as “a new 
constitutional settlement” and “the most ambitious and far reaching changes 
in the British constitution undertaken …this century.”28  Some academic 
commentators, however, have viewed it as lacking a master plan, with 
administrators merely adopting responses to political pressures on an ad hoc 
and incremental basis.  The result has been a policy that can be criticized as 
both incoherent and incomplete.29  Nevertheless, it has been undertaken in 
“the evolutionary and pragmatic tradition of the British constitution….”30   
                                                 
25  White Paper on Wales, Cm 3718 (1997); White Paper on Scotland Cm 3658 
(1997). 
26  White Paper Cm 4310 (1999). 
27  Turpin, British Government, 654. 
28  R. Hazel,  Constitutional Futures: A History of the Next Ten Years, (1999): 3. 
29 For example, Oliver, Constitutional Reform, 3. 
30 Turpin, British Government, 654. 
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Changes influenced by domestic policy post-1997 
 
“[W]e have embarked on a major programme of constitutional change 
realigning the most fundamental relationships between the state and the 
individual in ways that command the consent of the people affected.”31  This 
was the concluding remark in the Lord Chancellor’s statement of government 
policy at the end of 1998 and set the tone for New Labour’s programme of 
constitutional reform.  Since 1997, a good summary of the course of these 
events, including legislation, White Papers, and important political 
announcements and speeches, have been posted on the website of the Lord 
Chancellor’s Office, renamed in 2003, The Department for Constitutional 
Affairs.32  An up-to-date review of the major changes wrought so far lists 
fifteen major legislative events, any one of which would have constituted a 
“radical change.”33 
 
Reform to the House of Commons  
 
None of the major constitutional reforms have affected directly the 
House of Commons, but there have been numerous attempts to “modernise” 
it.  These have been made under the auspices of the Modernization 
Committee. Five main areas have been targeted:  
1. removal of some archaic practices and out of date rules (Select 
Committee, HC 600, 1998); 
2. creating easier public access to Parliament, and creating a 
Commons website for Parliamentary committees; 
3. reorganization of working hours; 
4. easing legislative programmes by allowing carry-over of bills; 
5. improvement of parliamentary scrutiny of legislation. 34 
Items (1)-(4) have been addressed successfully, but little or no progress has 
been made in the last category, thought the reform process is ongoing. 
Reform to the House of Lords  
Radical reform to the upper House has long been mooted, and early in 
the last century the Parliament Act 1911 stated that it was Parliament’s 
intention to create an upper chamber not based on hereditary qualifications.  
                                                 
31 http://www.dca.gov.uk/speeches/1998/lc-const.htm. 
32 http://www.dca.gov.uk/index.htm. 
33 Bogdanor, V. "Our New Constitution." Law Quarterly Review 120 (2004): 242-
262. 
34 Oliver, Constitutional Reform, 174. 
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The 1911 Act also effectively removed the veto power from the House of 
Lords, substantially diminishing its power vis-à-vis the House of Commons.35   
  
Reform was slow until 1997, but since then, New Labour has made a 
sustained if not wholly effectual effort to bring about meaningful change.  
There are several useful sources that provided summaries of reform since 
1997.36 Further useful information can be found under the House of Lords 
Constitution Committee.  This Committee enquires into “wider constitutional 
issues” and scrutinizes public bills for matters of constitutional significance.  
Its progress is summarised in Select Committee on the Constitution (2002).   
 
Following publication of numerous discussion papers and heated 
debate on the House of Lords Bill 34 1998-99, Parliament passed the House 
of Lords Act 1999.37 Although the original intention of the government in the 
Bill had been to remove all hereditary peers, a compromise had to be reached 
between the Labour and Conservative parties to allow a proportion of the 
peers, along with the deputy speakers, the Earl Marshal and the Lord Great 
Chamberlain to remain.  The rationale for this was that the government had at 
that stage no firm policy for determining the composition of the chamber after 
the passage of the Bill.  As a result, the House of Lords Act 1999 left the 
number and composition of members currently as follows: 575 life peers, 
twenty-six bishops, twenty-eight law lords (active and retired), and ninety-two 
hereditaries (total: 721).38 Altogether, the Act had removed 600 hereditary 
peers. 
 
Once the House of Lords Act 1999 had been passed, the government 
was faced with the dilemma of how best to reconstitute the future upper 
chamber, now shorn of all but 92 of the original hereditary peers.  To do this, 
it established a Royal Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Wakeham, 
which made 132 recommendations.  Although many of these dealt with 
relatively minor changes to the Lords’s legislative and scrutinizing functions, 
one of importance was the removal of its power to veto statutory instruments.  
Its main recommendations were to the composition of the upper house, where 
                                                 
35  See a summary at  http://www.dca.gov.uk/constitution/holref/holsdocs.htm. 
36 See, e.g., Research Papers (99/7,1999; 00/60, 2000; 01/77, 2001), and since 2002 
(03/85, 2003) at 
http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_publications_and_archives/research_papers.
cfm. 
37 See details of the debate in, for example, White Paper (Cm 4183, 1999), and 
Research Paper (98/95, 1999). 
38 See Oliver, Constitutional Reform, 189. 
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there would be 550 members.  The Law Lords would be retained, along with 
31 members of religious faiths, and there were to be between 65 and 195 
elected members. It was proposed that the remaining members would be 
appointed by a politically independent Appointments Committee.39   
 
The government accepted many of these recommendations, but 
rejected others.40  It favoured a larger house of up to 600 members, of whom 
332 would be political appointees, and, critically, it proposed that 
appointment of the latter be left to the political parties.  In addition to 
appointed members, the government’s plan foresaw 120 independent 
members nominated by the Appoinments Commission, a further120 directly 
elected members, 16 bishops, and at least 12 law lords.  It also favoured the 
removal of the remaining 92 hereditary peers.  The government also accepted 
the Royal Commission’s proposal for the establishment of an Appointments 
Commission, and this was set up in 2000. 
 
This plan generated so much criticism from many quarters, including 
the government’s own back benchers, that in 2002 it was forced to set up a 
Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform to consider the composition and 
powers of the House of Lords, its role, and authority.  After the committee 
had reported, the government responded and the whole matter was referred 
finally to the Constitutional Affairs Committee.41  The result of these complex 
deliberations was the publication in February 2004 of the Constitutional 
Reform Bill 2004, to which a House of Lords Select Committee responded in 
July 2004. 42  However, no resolution was reached before the General Election 
in May 2005, and the future of the House of Lords still remains to be 
resolved, notwithstanding the fact that piecemeal reform has already begun.  
As will be discussed in the next section, in its current form, the Constitutional 
Reform Bill also contains proposals for major changes to the judicial 
system.43 
 
 
 
                                                 
39  See full details in Royal Commission (Cm 4534, 2000), and a summary in 
Research Paper 2000 (00/60). 
40  See full details of this response in White Paper (2001, Cm 5291), and a summary 
in Research Paper 2002, 02/02).  
41 See details of the government’s response in a Special Report (2003). 
42 Constitutional Reform Bill Committee, HL 125, 2004. 
43 Including the abolition of the office of Lord Chancellor, the Creation of a Supreme 
Court, and reform of the judical appointments process. 
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Judicial reform 
 
Pressure has been building for a clear cut separation of powers 
between the judiciary on the one hand and the legislature and executive on the 
other.  It comes from two sources: domestic politics and European Human 
Rights law.  Because judges are appointed by the Lord Chancellor, a member 
of the Cabinet and effectively the Minister of Justice, they cannot be 
politically independent.44  Similarly, because the Lord Chancellor and Lords 
of Appeal in Ordinary who together constitute the Appellate Committee of the 
House of Lords – the Law Lords – also sit in the House of Lords, which is 
part of the legislature, their decisions cannot be seen to be politically 
impartial.  Based on the same logic, recent rulings in the European Court of 
Human Rights imply that decisions of the Appellate Committee of the House 
of Lords are incompatible with Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, , which deals with access to independent and impartial 
tribunals.45   
 
Devolution has further heightened the issue of separation of powers, 
with cases relating to devolution legislation being referred to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, where the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary also 
sit.  Following the report of the Constitutional Affairs Committee, the 
Government announced its next steps in the radical reform of the House of 
Lords, and other matters relating to the judiciary.46  These included: 
abolishment of the office of Lord Chancellor, the creation of a new, 
independent Supreme Court for the UK, and the creation of  a new Judicial 
Appointments Commission.  The last-named would be responsible for 
selecting candidates for appointment as judges in England and Wales.   
 
Apropos the post of Lord Chancellor, provision 53 states that “The 
office of Lord Chancellor will be not be abolished until all the relevant 
provisions of the Constitutional Reform Bill have been brought into effect and 
cannot be abolished until alternative arrangements for carrying out his 
functions are in place.”47  With this announcement the Lord Chancellor also 
became the Secretary for State for Constitutional Affairs (and the Lord 
Chancellor’s Department became the Department for Constitutional Affairs. 
                                                 
44  Oliver, Constitutional Reform, 330. 
45  See Oliver, Constitutional Reform, 331, and R. Masterman, “A Supreme Court for 
the United Kingdom: two steps forward, but one step back on judicial independence,” 
Public Law (2004): 48-58, for discussion of some cases.  
46 See Research Paper 03/85 (2003). 
47 See Department for Constitutional Affairs (2004). 
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After June 2003 three Consultation Papers set out in detail the 
proposals for:  
1. the creation of a Supreme Court (including the fate of the 
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (i.e. the Law 
Lords) and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council); 
2. creation of the Judicial Appointments Commission (i.e. a new 
mechanism for the appointment of judges);  
3. abolition of the post of Lord Chancellor.48  
 
  
Publication of the Constitutional Reform Bill in which these 
proposals were included provoked strong comment from across the political 
and professional spectrum, including a widely reported speech by Lord 
Woolf.49  These matters were considered by the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Constitutional Reform Bill, which reported on July 2, 
2004. 50  Although agreement was reached on 44 other issues, no resolution 
was reached on two of the three major items (1 & 3) listed above.  Further, a 
subsequent vote in the House of Lords on item (3) resulted in a defeat for the 
government, and until the matter can be re-considered by the Commons, the 
abolition of the post of Lord Chancellor has been deferred.  The Select 
Committee did agree to the establishment of a Judicial Appointments 
Commission (item 2).  Given the parliamentary timetable, it seems unlikely 
that the status of the Constitutional Reform Bill will be resolved until late 
2005 at the earliest.  
 
Devolution 
 
Of the four countries comprising the United Kingdom, only Northern 
Ireland experienced devolved government between 1800 and 1997 pursuant to 
the Union with Ireland Act.51 Since 1998, however, each country has had its 
own arrangement, and although they wield authority delegated from the 
Parliament at Westminster, they all differ in form and power.  
Constitutionally, the result of this is that Members of the Westminster 
Parliament have now lost, effectively, their right to play any part in legislation 
for the domestic affairs of Scotland and Northern Ireland, and their right to 
                                                 
48 See Consultation Papers CP 10/03, 11/03 and 13/03 for details.  
http://www.parliament.uk/what_s_on/what_s_on4.cfm#Consult. 
49 http://www.dca.gov.uk/judicial/speeches/lcj030304.htm. 
50 Constitutional Reform Bill Committee HL 125, (2004). 
51  From 1921 to 1972, under the Government of Ireland Act 1920, s. 75. Between 
1972 and 1978 there was Direct Rule from Whitehall. 
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draw up secondary legislation for the domestic affairs of Wales.  They retain 
these rights only for England, in addition to which, members sitting for 
constituencies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have been deprived of 
most of their constituency duties.52  The process of devolution followed by 
New Labour has transformed the Parliament in Westminster into a quasi-
federal institution: a Parliament for England, a federal Parliament for 
Northern Ireland and Scotland, and a Parliament for primary legislation for 
Wales.53 
 
Early attempts at devolution began with the Royal Commission on the 
Constitution 1973 under the chairmanship of Lord Kilbrandon.  Its 
recommendations were not unanimous.54  The Labour government then in 
power resolved to establish elected assemblies in Scotland and Wales, 
proposals for which were set out in a White Paper (1974).55 This resulted in 
legislation for devolution in 1978, but negative returns in referenda held in the 
two countries caused the Acts to be repealed.56  
 
New Labour committed itself to devolution prior to the 1997 election 
and upon assuming office, introduced White Papers in 1997 setting out 
proposals for Scotland and Wales.57 These were submitted to referenda in the 
two countries following the Referendum (Scotland and Wales) Act 1997, 
which resulted in positive returns in both.58 Bills based on the 1997 White 
Papers were introduced, and these culminated in the Scotland Act 1998 and 
Government of Wales Act 1998.  The Northern Ireland Act 1998 also 
devolved power to an elected assembly in this country and brought Direct 
Rule from Westminster to an end.  These pieces of legislation are backed up 
by various formal agreements between the UK government and the 
administrators of the devolved institutions that set out the principles by which 
they will conduct their business.  Although these are not legally binding, they 
establish the spirit and letter to be observed by all parties.59 The most 
                                                 
52  V. Bogdanor, “Our New Constitution.” Law Quarterly Review, (2004): 257. 
53 Ibid., 257. 
54  See Memorandum of Dissent attached to the Kilbrandon report, Cmnd 5460-I. 
55  White Paper, Democracy and Devolution: Proposals for Scotland and Wales, 
Cmnd. 5732 (1974). 
56  Wales Act 1978, and Scotland Act 1978. 
57  White Paper,  Scotland’s Parliament, Cm 3658 (1997), and White Paper, A Voice 
for Wales: The Government’s Proposals for a Welsh Assembly,  Cm 3718 (1997). 
58  Scotland: 74.3% (44.9% of total electorate), Wales: 50.3% (25.1% of total 
electorate). Figures from Turpin, British Government, 264. 
59 Ibid., 265. 
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important of these is the Memorandum of Understanding (2001) which 
established a Joint Ministerial Committee that acts as a consultative forum for 
Ministers of  the United Kingdom Government, Scottish and Northern Ireland 
Ministers, and Welsh Secretaries.  There are also a series of Concordats 
between opposite government departments, which, while not being legally 
binding, may prove actionable in proceedings for judicial review. 60 
 
Issues relating to devolution of power to Scotland and Wales are to be 
resolved ultimately by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.  None of 
these bodies can make legislation that is incompatible with EU law.  
  
Scottish Parliament 
 
The Scotland Act 1998 devolves primary legislative powers, but does 
not violate fundamentals of the Act of Union passed in 1706 by the English 
and in 1707 by the Scottish parliaments.  It created a unicameral parliament 
with ministers and civil servants who are servants of the Crown.  It currently 
has 129 members, some elected by proportional representation, for a four year 
term.  Fifteen areas of legislation are not within the competency of the 
Scottish Parliament and are “Reserved Matters” for Westminster (Schedule 5 
of the Act).61 Notwithstanding the devolved powers, Westminster retains the 
power to legislate for Scotland, and in law may override decisions taken in 
Edinburgh on devolved matters.62 
 
Scottish devolution has created a new constitutional anomaly: 59 
Scottish Members of Parliament currently still sit in the House of Commons, 
down from 72 in the 2001-05 parliament, and are able to vote on legislation 
that affects only England.  This anomaly is referred to as the West Lothian 
Question. 63 
 
Welsh Assembly 
 
The Government of Wales Act 1998 led to the creation of the 
National Assembly for Wales.  This is a unicameral body with 60 members 
who are elected for four years, partly by proportional representation.  The 
body exercises its power on behalf of the Crown, but its legislative 
                                                 
60 Ibid., 265. 
61  See Turpin, British Government, 276; see also Bradley & Ewing, Constitutional 
and Administrative Law, 43. 
62  Bradley & Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 45. 
63 See Standard Note SN/PC/2586, 2003. 
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competence extends only to subordinate matters: it lacks a general power to 
make laws for Wales and exercises only a secondary role in legislation.  Its 
function covers eighteen fields which have been transferred to it from 
Westminster and which were handled formerly by the Welsh Office (Schedule 
2 of the Wales Act 1998).64 The Secretary for State for Wales represents the 
country’s interests at Cabinet level, while he/she is allowed to attend, but not 
vote in, Assembly proceedings.  
 
Northern Ireland Assembly  
 
The Union with Ireland Act 1800 created the United Kingdom, which 
survived until legislation in 1922 with the passing of the Irish Free State Act, 
Irish Free State Constitution Act, and Irish Free State Act.  Together, this 
legislation created the independent Irish Free State within the 
Commonwealth.  Six counties remained within the United Kingdom by the 
Government of Ireland Act 1920 to create Northern Ireland.  Subsequently, 
the Ireland Act 1949 and the Northern Ireland Act 1998 confirmed that the 
country will remain part of the United Kingdom until a majority of the 
population of Northern Ireland vote in a referendum to re-unite with Ireland. 
 
Devolved government was transferred to Northern Ireland by the 
Government of Ireland Act 1920, which created a bicameral parliament that 
endured until 1972, when political violence forced Direct Rule to be imposed 
from Westminster.  This persisted, except for short breaks – in 1974 and again 
from 1982-86 – until 1998 when the Northern Ireland Act 1998 gave legal 
effect to a 1985 Inter-governmental Agreement and the 1998 Anglo-Irish 
Good Friday Agreement.65  In these agreements, the UK government came to 
an understanding with the Irish government and republican para-military 
groups under the terms of the Northern Ireland (Entry into Negotiations, etc.) 
Act 1996 for various forms of “power sharing.”  The latter process resulted in 
referenda being held simultaneously in Northern Ireland and the Irish 
Republic on the terms of the 1998 Belfast Agreement, which was accepted in 
both countries.  The 1985 Inter-governmental Agreement was replaced by a 
new Agreement in 1999. 66  The Northern Ireland Act 1998 also authorised the 
establishment of the following bodies: North/South Ministerial Council, 
                                                 
64  See Turpin, British Government, 285. 
65   For the former, see Great Britain Ireland, Agreement Between the Government of 
the United Kingdom…and the …Republic of Ireland Nov. 1985 (with joint 
communiqué), Cmnd 9657 Republic of Ireland (1985) 1, (1985).   
66  Treaty Series, 2000. For the discussion, see Turpin, British Government, 295. 
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British-Irish Council, Human Rights Commission and an Equality 
Commission.   
  
The Northern Ireland Assembly has 108 members who are elected for 
four years by proportional representation.  It has powers of primary legislation 
in matters not excepted or reserved from devolution by Westminster.67  
Membership of the Assembly is strictly regulated into “Nationalist” and 
“Unionist” categories so as to enforce the Belfast Agreement, whereby 
passing important decisions has to constitute “cross-community support”, 
which is achieved by a complicated formula.68  Because of continued 
violations of the Belfast Agreement, the Assembly is currently suspended and 
Direct Rule again prevails. 
 
Devolution to English Regions 
 
Devolution has created asymmetry in the constitutional framework of 
the UK, with England, which has 84 percent of the population, having no 
formal representative body.  The government responded to this situation by 
issuing a White Paper (2002), in which it proposed to hold referenda to gauge 
support for the creation of Regional Assemblies in each of eight “regions” 
created by the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998. 69  Currently, under 
the auspices of the Department of Trade & Industry, these Regional 
Development Agencies are only non-departmental public bodies.70  
 
Three regions were originally selected to hold referenda on the 
possibility of devolution of some administrative powers to regional bodies: 
North-West, North-East and Yorkshire & Humberside, but bureaucratic 
problems resulted in this being reduced to one, the North-East Region.  The 
referendum was held in November 2004 and resulted in a rejection of a 
regional assembly for the North-East Region by 78% of the voters in an all-
postal ballot.  The Government immediately shelved the proposed referenda 
in the other regions, and the issue of further devolution in England is now in 
abeyance. 
 
                                                 
67  Excepted  matters are given in s4 and Sch 2  and reserved matters  given in s 4 and 
Sch 3 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998.  
68  See Turpin, British Government, 297; see also Bradley & Ewing, Constitutional 
and Administrative Law, 46 for details. 
69 The regions are: North-West, North-East, Yorkshire & Humberside, West-
Midlands, East-Midlands, East of England, South-East, South-West. 
70  See Turpin, British Government, 267. 
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The eight regions created in England do not include the metropolitan 
area of Greater London, which has its own arrangements for devolved 
governance.  The government in Westminster initiated this devolutionary 
process by issuing a White Paper which proposed an elected Mayor and 
London Assembly. 71  These were approved by a referendum of London’s 
citizens in 1998 authorised by the Greater London Authority Act 1998, and 
put into effect via the Greater London Authority Act 1999.  This created a 
new form of city government in the UK, with the election in 2000 of a Mayor 
and twenty-five assembly members sitting for four-year terms.  Voting was by 
a form of proportional representation.  The new body has powers to promote 
economic, social and environmental development, and has various subsidiary 
bodies under its jurisdiction: London Development Agency, Transport for 
London, Metropolitan Police Authority, and the London Fire and Emergency 
Planning Authority.  Ultimately, under the Local Government Act 2000, other 
metropolitan areas in England may be given the option to have elected 
mayors. 
 
Other areas of reform 
 
Monarchy and the royal prerogative 
 
Central government is carried out in the name of the Crown, which is 
the governmental aspect of the monarch’s power.  The Crown has a legal 
corporate personality (distinguishable from the monarch), and is separate 
from the Ministers and civil servants who act in its name.  This legal persona 
is rooted in common law.  Many of the government’s powers are based on the 
royal prerogatives that also derive from common law, while some special 
prerogatives are reserved for the monarch.72 Theoretically, the latter can be 
exercised by the monarch, but conventionally they are used on the advice of 
his/her Ministers.  There are three constitutionally important powers in this 
category:  
1. to dissolve Parliament and precipitate a general election; 
2. choosing the Prime Minister in the case of there being no clear-cut 
candidate; 
3. assenting to legislation (i.e. withholding assent creates a veto on 
government Bills, last used in 1707).  
                                                 
71  Cm 3897 (1998). 
72 Oliver, Constitutional Reform, 204;  Bradley & Ewing, Constitutional and 
Administrative Law, 233. 
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Currently, reform of these personal prerogatives does not form part of 
government policy, but the possibility of introducing fixed term parliaments 
would nullify the monarch’s power to dissolve Parliament and call general 
elections.73  
 
An extension of the royal prerogative to Parliament allows the 
government to undertake a wide variety of actions in the name of the Crown, 
particularly in the areas of national security, granting of royal charters, public 
and political appointments, the honours system, and accountability of 
Ministers.  Regulation of these powers is political rather than formal or 
statutory.74  Reform has proceeded piecemeal through case law and 
amendments to the Ministerial Code (2001).75 
 
Civil Service 
 
It is important constitutionally that civil servants enjoy tenure of 
office without regard to changes in the political complexion of the 
government in power.  Currently, professional standards in the civil service 
are regulated by the Civil Service Management Code  that requires of them 
honest and impartial advice.76  The Code is constantly updated, but for several 
years there have been moves to put the civil service on a statutory basis to 
ensure more effective parliamentary scrutiny. 
 
In 2000, the Parliamentary Committee on Standards in Public Life 
produced a lengthy report dealing with revision of standards that should apply 
to Members of Parliament, Ministers, Civil Servants, Special Advisors and 
Quangos.77  One of the problems highlighted was the increasing importance in 
public life of politically appointed special advisors and their role vis-à-vis 
civil servants, who are politically neutral.  The report recommended that along 
                                                 
73 See Blackburn & Plant, Constitutional Reform: The Labour Government’s 
Constitutional Reforms Agenda, for a pro-reform discussion. 
74 Oliver, Constitutional Reform, 205. 
75 For examples in Oliver: Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil 
Service ([1985] AC 374, introduced judicial review of government decisions into 
exercises of royal prerogative; M. v. Home Office ([1994] 1 AC 377), found the Home 
Secretary in contempt of court. 
76 
http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/management_information/management/management_
code/index.asp. 
77 Committee on Standards in Public Life, Sixth Report: Reinforcing Standards, Cm 
4557, (2000). 
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with rules tightening up training, introduction of codes for validating 
performances, maintenance of political impartiality and the embedding in 
statute of core values for civil servants, a separate code of conduct was 
needed for special advisors.78 
 
The government’s response was generally favourable, and on the 
contentious issue of special advisors it agreed to limit numbers and to provide 
a separate code of practice.79  Eventually, the Civil Service (No. 2) Bill [HL] 
was introduced which drastically cut the spending and management power of 
special advisors, while also limiting their numbers.  Significantly, it proposed 
enshrining in statute for the first time the political neutrality of civil servants.  
It also allowed for full publication of the civil service codes, the setting up of 
a mechanism to oversee and monitor recruitment, and employment of 
individuals born outside the UK.80  However, because the bill did not pass 
through the Lords before the May 2005 General Election, the long-promised 
statutes to regulate the civil service have yet to materialise. 
 
Electoral Law 
 
Proportional Representation (PR)  
 
On election to office, New Labour appointed the Independent 
Commission on the Voting System under the chairmanship of Lord Jenkins 
(Jenkins Commission, 1998). The commission recommended the introduction 
of PR, but so far, no proposals for a change in the voting system for the 
Westminster Parliament have been made.81  However, provisions were made 
in the Scotland Act 1998, Government of Wales Act 1998, Northern Ireland 
Act 1998, and the Greater London Authority Act 1999 for the introduction of 
various forms of PR to be made for elections to the devolved parliaments and 
assemblies.82 
 
                                                 
78 Ibid. 
79  The Government’s Response to Sixth Report of the Committee on Standards in 
Public Life, Reinforcing Standards, Cm 4817 (2000). 
80  A Draft Civil Service Bill, Cm 6373 (2004). 
81  This is a first past the post system with each parliamentary constituency returning a 
single candidate. 
82  Scotland and Wales have a mixed Westminster and additional member PR system, 
Northern Ireland has a single transferable vote PR system, and London a 3 vote 
regime, one of which is used in an additional member PR system. 
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The European Parliamentary Elections Act 1999 introduced a closed 
party list PR system for the 1999 election of members to the European 
Parliament which sits in Strasbourg and Brussels.  It is also proposed to use 
this system for the election of the 120 elected members to the reconstituted 
House of Lords.83 
 
Referenda 
 
There has been increasing use of national referenda to advise 
governments on important issues in recent years, and in 1996 the Independent 
Commission on the Conduct of Referendums proposed a Referendums Act 
(Electoral Reform Society, 1996).84  So far, this has not been initiated, 
although future referenda have been promised by the Government on 
acceptance of the proposed EU Constitution, and the UK’s entry into the 
Eurozone.  There is statutory provision for referenda in the Government of 
Wales Act 1998 and for polls or referenda for specific instances in local 
government, but no general regulations on the subject. 
 
Electoral procedures 
 
In 1997 the terms of reference of the Committee on Standards in 
Public Life were extended to investigate party funding. 85  Its report led to the 
passing of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 which, 
inter alia, regulates the registration of political parties and public funding for 
campaign groups, including spending limits on referendum campaigns.  This 
Act has imposed a strict regime on the funding for parties, including banning 
donations from non-EU sources.  It also legislated for the establishment and 
supervisory role of the Electoral Commission, which is a politically 
independent body accountable directly to Parliament and is now responsible 
for regulating elections in the UK and for parliamentary and local government 
boundary reviews.86  
 
 
 
                                                 
83  White Paper, The House of Lords: Completing the Reform, Cmd 5291 (2001): 
paragraphs 48-53.  
84  For examples: 1975 on EC membership, 1978 and 1998 on devolution.  See also 
Oliver, Constitutional Reform, 155.  See also Standard Note, Thresholds in 
Referendums, SN/PC/2809 (2004).  
85 Committee on Standards in Public Life, Cm 4057, 1998. 
86  For details, see Oliver, Constitutional Reform, 149. 
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Freedom of Information legislation 
 
Prior to 1997, government practice in relation to access to official 
information rested upon a Code of Practice on Access to Government 
Information that was introduced in 1994 and revised in 1997.  This arose from 
proposals made in a White Paper (Cm 2290, 1993) produced by the previous 
administration.  Immediately on assuming office in 1997, New Labour 
published its own White Paper (Cm 3818, 1997), setting out new proposals 
for a statutory right to access official information.  This was hailed as a very 
progressive statement of intent, and included the establishment of an 
Information Commissioner.87  There was a long delay while the government 
considered the matter, and a series of reports was issued: House of Commons 
Select Committee (1999); House of Lords Committee (1999); and finally a 
Report to the Home Secretary (1999) on openness in the public sector.  
  
The final outcome was that the public’s right of access was greatly 
watered down in the resulting Freedom of Information Act 2000, which 
contains a less strict code for moderating refusal to disclose data and permits 
broad exceptions.88  The delay in implementation and regression in degree of 
access to information suggests that there is little sign of genuine desire for 
openness in government.89  Despite these changes, the post of Information 
Commissioner has been maintained.  Inter alia , it is his/her responsibility to 
promote good practice by public authorities, but orders for disclosure by the 
Commissioner can still be overridden by a Minister.  The Freedom of 
Information Act 2000 finally came into force at the beginning of 2005.  
 
Changes influenced by European legislation 
 
General European Union legislation 
 
The European Economic Community (EEC) was established by the 
Treaty of Rome 1957, and the United Kingdom became a member by signing 
the Treaty of Accession 1973.  This was facilitated by the European 
Communities Act 1972.  Constitutionally, signing the Treaty created a novel 
problem in that legislation was needed that would accept “…in advance as 
                                                 
87  See Oliver, Constitutional Reform, 164. 
88 For example, for “prejudice to the public interest.” 
89 Oliver, Constitutional Reform, 168. 
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part of the law of the United Kingdom…provision to be made in the future by 
instruments issued by the Community institutions….”90   
 
The various European treaties to which the United Kingdom has 
acceded, have major constitutional significance because, “…the terms of the 
European treaties as interpreted by the European Court of Justice require 
members to subordinate their sovereignty and that of their Parliaments to the 
Community institutions, and to give direct effect and primacy to European 
law.”91  An example of this can be seen in the method for taking important 
decisions.  In the EEC, this was originally based on unanimity, but a major 
change to its regulations was altered, in many areas, to the majority rule.  The 
change was accepted by the UK when Parliament passed the Single European 
Act 1986, although the changes were later overtaken by the Maastricht Treaty 
1992, which ushered in the European Union.   
 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) sits in Luxembourg and has the 
responsibility of ensuring that “…in the interpretation and application of [the] 
Treaty the law is observed”.92  Its judgments have ensured that the loss of 
sovereignty by member states includes their constitutional laws, and this 
applies not only to the states, but also to their nationals.93  EC law supremacy 
was confirmed in the UK courts through five cases (1989-2000) known 
collectively as the Factortame series.94  The final judgment resulted in an Act 
of the Westminster Parliament, the Merchant Shipping Act 1988, being “dis-
applied.” 
 
The European Parliament, was established as an “Assembly,” which 
was confirmed in its present form by the Single European Act 1986.  Member 
states of the EU elect Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) for five-
                                                 
90 White Paper, Legal and Constitutional Implications of the United Kingdom 
Membership of the European Communities, Cmnd 3301 (1967). See also Bradley & 
Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 135. 
91 Oliver, Constitutional Reform, 63. 
92 EC Treaty, art 220. 
93 See for example ECJ landmark rulings in Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Tarief 
Commissie ([1963] CMLR105, 129) (cited in Oliver, Constitutional Reform, 63; 
Bradley & Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 128); and Costa v ENEL 
(C6/64) [1964] ECR 1141 (cited in Bradley & Ewing, Constitutional and 
Administrative Law, 128). 
94 Initial case R v Transport Secretary, ex p Factortame Ltd (No 1)  [1989] 2 CMLR 
353 (CA).  For a discussion of these cases, see Bradley & Ewing, Constitutional and 
Administrative Law, 141. 
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year terms.  The UK originally had 87 MEPs, but this was reduced to 72 in 
the 2004-2009 session.  They are elected by proportional representation on a 
closed party list system, which was ushered in by the European Parliamentary 
Elections Act 1999.  The European Parliament does not have independent 
legislative competence and it cannot initiate proposals for legislation by the 
Council of the European Union.  “The Council is the main decision-making 
body of the European Union…[its] acts …can take the form of regulations, 
directives, decisions, common actions or common positions, 
recommendations or opinions.  The Council can also adopt conclusions, 
declarations or resolutions.  When the Council acts as a legislator, in principle 
it is the European Commission that makes proposals.  These are examined 
within the Council, which can modify them before adopting them.”95  The 
Council is obliged to “consult” Parliament on its acts, and if Parliament 
accedes then the process is passed as a “co-decision,” but should 
disagreement arise, the Council can dispense with Parliament’s opinion. 96 
 
The European Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons (ESC)  
“assesses the legal and/or political importance of each EU document, decides 
which EU documents are debated, monitors the activities of UK Ministers in 
the Council, and keeps legal, procedural and institutional developments in the 
EU under review.”97  A Commons resolution in November 1998 stated that no 
Minister can agree to any proposal for EC legislation until the matter has been 
scrutinised by the ESC.98 
 
Human Rights  
 
The Maastricht Treaty committed member states of the European 
Union to respect fundamental rights as enshrined in the European Convention 
on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR).  This document was drawn up by the 
Council of Europe , comprising 45 states, most of which are not members of 
the EC/EU.  The UK ratified the treaty in 1951, and in 1966 began allowing 
individuals the right to petition.  However, because international treaties 
cannot give rights that are enforceable in domestic courts unless they have 
been incorporated into law by statute, interpretations of the European Court of 
Human Rights of the ECHR were not enforceable by UK courts until the 
passing of the Human Rights Act 1998. 99  This act is a “…constitutional 
                                                 
95 http://www.unadr.org/cila2005/guias/CEU_CILA2005.doc. 
96 Oliver, Constitutional Reform, 64. , & Turpin, British Government, 341. 
97 http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/european_scrutiny.cfm. 
98 Bradley & Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 138. 
99  See Oliver, Constitutional Reform, 112. 
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instrument introducing into domestic law the relevant articles of the 
Convention....”100  Thus, while rights are theoretically enforceable only 
against public authorities, there are implications for the common law and for 
litigation between private parties.101  There is provision within the Convention 
for derogation on certain matters, and the UK used these powers in respect of 
detention provision for terrorism legislation. 
 
The Nice Treaty 2000 proclaimed the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union but it was not incorporated formally.  Consequently, it 
is not binding on member states, but the ECJ can be expected to have regard 
to the Charter in applying and developing Community law.102 
 
European Union Constitution 
 
There are three major constitutional issues facing the UK in the 
medium term with respect to EU legislation:  
1. the pressure for closer political union;  
2. the “democratic deficit” of the legislative process that is operated by 
unelected and hence unaccountable members of the EU structure; 
3. the constitutional base upon which the whole “enterprise” is 
constructed.103 
The final text of the Constitution was agreed at the Heads of Government 
Summit held in Brussels on 18th June 2004, and was signed by all national 
leaders of the EU in Rome on October 29, 2004.104  It was endorsed by the 
European Parliament on January 12, 2005, but individual member states still 
need to ratify it.  Eleven states announced their intention of holding a 
referendum on the issue: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and United 
Kingdom.  To date, Spain has done so positively, while France and the 
Netherlands have done so negatively.  The remaining fourteen states plan to 
ratify it via their national parliaments; and the first to do so was Lithuania on 
November 11, 2004. 
 
Currently, the matter of adoption of the European Constitution by the 
UK is a controversial issue that bears on all three issues listed above.  The 
Prime Minister announced in April 2004 that a referendum would be held in 
                                                 
100  Lord Woolf, CJ in R v Offen [2001] 1 WLR 253. 
101 Bradley & Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 420. 
102 Turpin, British Government, 365. 
103 Bradley & Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 144. 
104 The full text is at:  http://european-convention.eu.int/bienvenue.asp?lang=EN. 
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the UK before ratification, but no date for this has yet been announced, 
though it is widely expected to be in 2006.  Depending on whether it is 
accepted by the Westminster Parliament, this document has profound 
constitutional implications for the UK. 
 
Conclusions  
 
The constitution of the United Kingdom is not vested in a single 
document.  Rather it is a composite of statutes, legal decisions, customs and 
parliamentary rules.  This results in a flexible system that depends ultimately 
on the sovereignty and supremacy of the Westminster Parliament.  
Constitutional reform is therefore the natural outcome of long-term evolution 
of political and democratic principles, and is an ongoing process.  Since 1997, 
however, New Labour governments have made the acceleration of reform a 
political goal.  We have summarised the main areas where this has occurred.   
 
Parliament itself has been the subject of much scrutiny.  While small 
changes have been made to modernize the House of Commons, radical 
actions have been taken in the House of Lords, where the number of 
hereditary peers has been reduced from nearly 700 to 92.  Further plans to 
remove hereditary peers altogether and to replace them with nominated or 
elected members have stalled, and the government has not yet come forward 
with proposals for appointing members to the upper house. 
 
In tandem with the reforms to the House of Lords, plans to create a 
Judicial Appointments Commission, a Supreme Court, and to abolish the post 
of Lord Chancellor also await resolution.  The last two issues have proved so 
controversial that the government has had to back away from its draft 
legislation. 
 
Minor revisions have also affected electoral laws, regulating 
campaign funding and the activities of political parties.  More significantly, 
the passing of freedom of information legislation may soon bring about 
changes to aspects of the machinery government and a new focus on 
bureaucratic transparency.  
 
Meanwhile, the establishment of a Scottish Parliament and legislative 
assemblies for Wales and Northern Ireland have created a quasi-federal 
arrangement for the United Kingdom, though continuing violations of earlier 
agreements have necessitated the suspension of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly and a return to direct rule from Westminster.  Plans to devolve 
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some powers to regions within England have been thwarted in the only 
referendum yet held on the topic, but an elected mayor and assembly have 
been installed in the metropolitan area of London. 
 
Finally, the matter of national sovereignty within the European Union 
has become a politically divisive issue in the United Kingdom.  The 
incorporation into national law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, in addition to diverse items of European Union legislation, has 
curtailed parliament’s traditional sovereignty.  Jurisdiction in these areas has 
passed to the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of 
Justice.  The adoption of the European Constitution by the twenty-five 
national governments of the European Union would accelerate this trend, 
although at present the issue awaits a referendum in both the UK, and several 
other member states.  
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